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Casenote
AVOIDANCE OF THE DISINTERESTED WITNESS
RULE BY CODICILLIARY REPUBLICATION
OR INCORPORATION: In re Estate of Pye,
325 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1971)
I. INTRODUCTION
The facts of a recent District of Columbia case raised various
issues concerning who can properly be an attesting witness to testa-
mentary instruments. The court in In re Estate of Pye1 was presented
with the question of the effect of two codicils upon the disposition
of an estate. The first codicil was attested to by three witnesses, two
of whom also received bequests under it; the second codicil was
witnessed by the same three individuals, but only one of the three
witnesses received a bequest from the second codicil. Although
both instruments were attested by three witnesses, only two wit-
nesses were required by the District of Columbia Code.2 Like the
law in almost every other American jurisdiction, District of Colum-
bia law provides that an attesting witness to a will cannot receive
a bequest from the attested instrument. This rule is often called
the "disinterested witness" requirement.3 In applying this rule, the
court held that the two witness-legatees lost their gifts under the
first codicil, but the bequest made in the second codicil was held to
be valid.
Most of the opinion in Pye deals with the second codicil,4 where
only one of the three witnesses was "interested," i.e., a legatee. The
second codicil thus raised the issue of whether an interested witness
can keep the bequest if there are a sufficient number of disinterested
witnesses. Although the question was one of first impression in the
District of Columbia, most jurisdictions have statutory provisions
1 325 F. Supp. 321 (D.C.C. 1971).
2 D.C. CODE ANw. § 18-103 (1967).
3 D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-104 (1967), is the Statute of George II, 25 Geo.
2, c. 6, § 1 (1752): ". . . If any person shall attest the execution of
any will or codicil ... to whom any devise, legacy ... shall be given,
the will or codicil shall, so far only as concerns such persons attesting
the execution of such will or codicil be utterly null and void and such
person shall be admitted as a witness to the execution of such will
or codiciL"
4 The first codicil represented a $300 bequest and the second codicil
contained a $10,000 gift; thus, the first was hardly worth litigating.
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to deal with this contingency. Almost every state 5 provides that an
interested witness can keep the bequest if "there be two other
competent subscribing witnesses,"r6 and the court in Pye did allow
the bequest to the interested witness where there were two dis-
interested witnesses. The court reached this result without the
benefit of such a statute.
There is no reference in Pye to any legal theory or argument
that could have supported the first codicil's validity. However,
there are theories that could have been used to uphold the first
codicil. This casenote will discuss the closely related arguments
that the second codicil either (1) "republished" or (2) "incorporated
by reference" the earlier codicil and remedied its defects. The his-
torical development of the disinterested witness rule will also be
explored, and the wisdom of the rule requiring disinterested wit-
nesses to testamentary instruments will be examined.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DISINTERESTED WITNESS REQUIREMENT
The requirement of nonlegatee-witnesses to testamentary instru-
ments is a relatively recent addition to Anglo-American law. Except
by local custom in some areas of England,7 a freehold estate could
not be devised under early common law.8 In the first Wills Act of
1540,9 Parliament gave Englishmen not subject to similar local
custom the power to devise; the only formality was that the will
be in writing.'0 The Statute of Frauds" in 1678 introduced the
requirement of three or four "credible" witnesses, and this formality
was included in the Statute of Victoria 12 which replaced the earlier
acts.
Common law rules of evidence were used to ascertain the mean-
ing of "credible witnesses,'13 the phrase used in the Statute of
5 The exceptions are Georgia, New Jersey, Maine, Rhode Island and
South Carolina.
* NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-207 (Reissue 1964). See also CAL. P!OB. CoDE § 51(West 1956).
7 See 2 W. PAGE, WILLS § 19.2 (3d ed. 1960).
8 G. THoMPsox, THE LAW OF WLLs 18 (3d ed. 1947).
9 The Act of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540).
10 2 W. PAGE, supra note 7, § 19.2.
11 An Act for Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 29 Cor. 2, c. 3, § 5
(1678).
12 An Act for the Amendment of the Laws with respect to Wills, 7 Win.
4 & 1 Vict., c. 26 (1837).
13 A "credible witness" was one who was "competent" to testify in
court as to the facts to which he attested by signing the will. Holdfast v.
Dowsing, 93 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1746).
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Frauds. It was subsequently held that a legatee could not witness
a will because of an interest in the outcome of possible litigation
involving the will; 14 thus a testamentary instrument witnessed by
a legatee was, in the words of the Statute of Frauds, "utterly void
and of none effect."'15
In order to save a will attested to by legatees, English courts
allowed a witness to release his legacy and thus render himself
competent to testify. In 1746 this subterfuge was condemned in
Holdfast v. Dowsing,16 but six years later the Statute of George 117
in effect made mandatory the old practice. The new act provided
that a legatee was a competent witness to a will, but that the
legatee's bequest was automatically forfeited.
In most states the statutes requiring disinterested witnesses to
testamentary instruments are similar to the early English statutes. 8
Only one state allows a legatee to witness a will or codicil and keep
his bequest.19 Most states provide statutes similar to that of George
II, making legatees "competent" witnesses by voiding the bequest2o
to them. The majority of states have statutes allowing a legatee-
witness to take a bequest up to the amount of his intestate share;
2'
the District of Columbia reached this result by case law in Manou-
kian v. Tomrasian,22 as noted in Pye.
The application of the disinterested witness rule can have in-
equitable results; a good example of this is when a will is prepared
without the assistance of an attorney, and the testator turns to his
family for witnesses.2 8 The history of the rule is one of avoidance
14 Id
15 Supra note 11.
16 93 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1746).
17 25 Geo. 2, c. 6, § 1 (1752)._
18 See Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. Rsv. 613, 633 (1960).
19 PA. STAT. tit. 20 (1950).
20 For example, N.Y., D CD. EST. LAW § 27 (McKinney 1949), provides:
"If any person shall be a subscribing witness to the execution of any
will... any bequest... shall be void, so far as concerns such wit-
ness ... and such person shall be a competent witness...."
21 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-208 (Reissue 1964): "If [any interested
witness] would have been entitled to any share of the estate of the
testator, in case the will was not established, then so much of the share
that would have descended or have been distributed to such witness,
as will not exceed the devise or bequest made to him in the will,
shall be saved to him... in proportion to and out of the parts devised
or bequeathed to them."
22 237 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
23 Infra pp. 179-81.
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and mitigation of the resulting forfeiture of bequests. Various
theories were thus readily available for the court in Pye to avoid
the rule and to hold the first codicil valid.
III. VALIDATION OF THE FIRST
CODICIL BY THE SECOND CODICIL
The court in Pye raised issues it did not discuss when it held
the bequests in the first codicil invalid. Two closely related (and
often confused) theories can be used to argue that the defects in
the first codicil were remedied by the second codicil. The first
theory is "republication"; the second concept is termed "incorpora-
tion by reference."
A. REP BLiCAION
The general rule is that a valid codicil "republishes" an earlier
will, and that the two instruments speak from the date of the codicil
and the codicil draws the will to its own date.24 In Newsome v.
Carpenter5' it was held that the words "last will and testament"
were sufficient notice of the probate of both a will and a codicil.
The court said: "[T]he law is well settled that a properly executed
codicil has the effect of validating and republishing the prior will so
that the will and codicil will then be considered as one instrument
speaking from the date of the codicil."2 There is no question that
the second codicil in Pye republished the original will.
The rationale for the rule that a codicil republishes an earlier
will is well stated in Taft v. Stearns.2 7 There the court reasoned that
the execution of a codicil "imports in the mind of the person execut-
ing the codicil the existence of a will which can be supplemented
and modified."28 In other words, the execution of a codicil is an
implied estatement or rewriting of the earlier testamentary instru-
ment.
Because a codicil is a restatement of prior testamentary intent,
it has been well settled that an improperly executed will is.validated
24Kenfield v. Dudek, 135 Neb. 574, 283 N.W. 209 (1939); In re Appeal
of Rogers, 126 Me. 267, 138 A. 59 (1927); First Mech. Nat. Bank v.
Norris, 134 N.J. Eq. 229, 34 A.2d 749 (1943); White v. Conference
Claimants Endowment Comm'n, 81 Idaho 17, 336 P.2d 674 (1959).
25 382 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
26 Id. at 355.
27 234 Mass. 273, 125 N.E. 570 (1920).
28 Id. at 276, 125 N.E. at 571.
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by a properly executed codicil.2 In Johnson v. Johnson0° the court
stated that "[A] codicil validly executed operates as a republication
of the will no matter what defects may have existed in the execution
of the earlier document,"'3 and that an improperly signed, dated,
and witnessed will is validated by a codicil. An early Iowa case,
In re Will of Murfield,3 2 held that a codicil validated a will which
had a beneficiary as one of the two subscribing witnesses. And the
Supreme Court of Nebraska in In re Estate of Kaiser33 noted that
a properly executed codicil republishes a will and "remedies all the
defects in its execution.
'3 4
As demonstrated by the above, there is ample authority to hold
that the second codicil in Pye remedied any possible defects in the
will. However, the defect in question was in an earlier codicil.
There is very little authority on the question of whether a codicil
republishes an earlier codicil. It would seem that if a testator had
an earlier will in mind when he made a codicil he would also have
in mind earlier codicils, so that the reasoning behind a codicil
validating a will by republication would apply equally to the
validation of earlier codicils by republication. The few American
cases that have ruled upon this issue have held that a codicil does
republish and validate a previous codicil.
In Camp v. Shaw3 5 the testator attached to his will a paper
marked "sheet B," but it was not acknowledged or attested. The
court said:
We think that if, after the execution of the original will, the
deceased wrote sheet B and attached it to the will, intending it
to operate as a codicil... the [latter] codicil operated as a pub-
lication and due execution of the sheet B and the will, all speaking
from the date of the codicil.3 6
This opinion was later affirmed, 37 but it is not clear if the higher
court considered the sheet B a codicil or an alteration of the will.
29 Hinson v. Hinson, 154 Tex. 561, 280 S.W.2d 731 (1955); Robinson v.
Harmon, 107 Ohio App. 206, 157 N.E.2d 749 (1958); Foster v. Tanner,
221 Ga. 402, 144 S.E.2d 775 (1965).
30 279 P.2d 928 (Okla. 1954).
31 Id. at 931.
32 74 Iowa 479, 38 N.W. 170 (1888).
33 150 Neb. 295, 34 N.W.2d 366 (1948).
34 Id. at 305, 34 N.W.2d at 373.
35 52 Ill. App. 241 (1893).
36 Id. at 250.
37 Shaw v. Camp, 163 Ill. 144, 45 N.E. 211 (1896).
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In Gordan v. Lord Reay,8 an English case, it was held that an
unattested codicil was republished by a later codicil, and the defec-
tive codicil was remedied. 39 , However, twelve years later in de
Zichy Ferraris v. Marquis of Hertford" the English courts rejected
the theory that a codicil republishes prior codicils, and instead
adopted the "incorporation by reference" doctrine.
Other courts have stated as dicta that a codicil republishes and
validates a defectively executed prior codicil. A good example of
this type of opinion is Hurley v. Blankenship,4 1 where the testator
executed only one codicil. The court said that "[a] codicil duly exe-
cuted will operate as a republication of an earlier will or codicil,
although the latter is inoperative or imperfectly executed or at-
tested."
42
A Pennsylvania decision which applied New Jersey law, In re
Butler's Estate4 3 seems to hold -that a second codicil "republishes
[an earlier] codicil, incapable of passing New Jersey real estate,
because without subscribing witnesses, and makes effective a devise
... therein."44 Although in the syllabus and in the opinion the court
used the term republication, the English cases dealing with incorpo-
ration by reference of prior codicils were reviewed. In fact, at one
point the court stated that: "[T]he real question is whether it [the
later codicil] refers not only to the will, but also to the first codicil
with a certainty sufficient to republish the later also."45 Butler is
an excellent example of the way two similar theories, codicilliary
republication and incorporation by reference, are often confused.4
6
B. INCORPORATioN BY REYiEmcE
The doctrine of incorporation by reference is distinct from the
theory of republication. If a properly executed testamentary instru-
ment refers with sufficient clarity to a distinctly extraneous docu-
ment, the extraneous document becomes incorporated into the testa-
mentary instrument and becomes a part of the testamentary instru-
38 58 Eng. Rep. 339 (Ch. 1832).
09 The second codicil confirmed only the provisions of the will, so the
doctrine of incorporation by reference had no effect on the decision.
40 163 Eng. Rep. 794 (P. & D. 1844), aff'd sub. noam. Croker v. Marquis of
Hertford, 13 Eng. Rep. 334 (P.C. 1844).
41 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W.2d 963 (1950).
42 Id. at 52, 229 S.W.2d at 965.
43 29 Pa. Dist. 683 (1917).
44 Syllabus of Court, Id.
45 Id. at 686.
46 Evans, Testamentary.Republication., 40 HARv. L. REV. 71 (1926).
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ment.47  To be incorporated, the extrinsic material must be in
existance when the will or codicil is executed. 48
A number of cases have dealt with the question of whether a
codicil incorporated by reference a prior codicil. In the case of
In re Walto's Estate49 the court said:
One of the subscribing witnesses did not attest [the first codicil]
in the presence of the testator. But there was a subsequent codicil,
properly executed and attested, and that codicil contained an ex-
press republication of both the will and the first codicil, and the
latter instrument was thereby validated.& 0
It should be noted that the court referred to an "express republica-
tion" of the first codicil, which is another confusion of republication
and incorporation by reference. The court apparently meant "ex-
press reference" since it applied the incorporation by reference
doctrine to validate the first codicil.
As mentioned previously, in de Zichy Ferraris v. Marquis of
Hertford5 the English courts rejected the theory of republication
in favor of incorporation by reference. In Hertford the court said:
"In order to incorporate the [unattested] codicil.., there must not
only be a plain identification, but a sufficient certainty."52 The
necessity for a specific reference to a prior codicil, under the theory
of codicilliary incorporation by reference, was later emphasized in
Burton v. Newberry.53
In Pye the second codicil may have contained a specific reference
to the first codicil, thus incorporating it by reference, but the facts
of the case do not cite the exact wording of the second codicil. It is
quite possible that the second codicil in Pye contained a sufficient
reference to the first codicil under the criteria of some decisions.
For example, if the second codicil in Pye had recited that it was a
"further codicil,"" or a "further codicil to my last will and codi-
cils,"55 it would probably be a sufficient reference to incorporate
47 Clark v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Collingswood, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118
A.2d 108 (1955); Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 230 S.W.2d
51 (1950); In re Gregory's Estate, 70 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1954).
48 Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va. 511, 47 S.E.2d 431 (1948).
49 194 Pa. 528, 45 A. 426 (1900).
50 Id. at 428.
51 163 Eng. Rep. 794 (P. & D. 1844).
52 Croker v. Hertford, 13 Eng. Rep. 334, 339 (P.C. 1844).
53 L.R. 1 Ch.D. 234 (1875).
54 Radburn v. Jervis, 49 Eng. Rep. 77 (Ch. 1841).
55 Manship v. Stewart, 181 Ind. 299, 104 N.E. 505 (1914).
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the first codicil. A reference to the previous codicil by date would
also have incorporated it.5 6
In summary, the court in Pye should have examined the second
codicil for a reference to the first codicil. The second codicil may
have incorporated by reference the prior codicil, which would have
enabled the court to validate the bequests made in the first codicil.
However, even if the second codicil did not incorporate the first
codicil by reference the doctrine of codicilliary republication could
have been used to validate the first codicil. Republication can be
used to remedy the defective execution of a prior codicil without
the later instrument specifically referring to the earlier one so that
codicilliary reublication has wider application than incorporation by
reference.
IV. EXAMINATION OF THE POLICY OF
REQUIRING DISINTERESTED WITNESSES
As demonstrated by the above, the court in Pye could have
allowed bequests to interested witnesses. Pye thus presents the
question of whether the disinterested witness rule is actually neces-
sary in modern American law. The primary reason for requiring
non-legatee witnesses that is generally given is to protect the testator
from undue influence and to prevent a group of conspiring witnesses
from presenting a fraudulent will for the testator's signature.57 This
rationale for the disinterested witness rule was first stated in 1788
by Lord Camden, who feared the fraud:
[S]o commonly practiced upon dying men, whose hands have sur-
vived their heads; who still have strength enough to write a name,
or make a mark, though the capacity of disposing is dead. What is
the condition of such an object, in the power of a few, who are
suffered to attend him, wheedled, or teized, into submission, for
the sake of a little ease; put to the laborious task of recollecting the
full state of all his affairs, and to weigh the just merits, and de-
merits, of those, who belong to him, by remembering all, and
forgetting none!58
It should be noted that sickbed wills are often holographic, and a
number of states further protect the testator by requiring all the
formalities of execution required for non-holographic wills.59
56 Aaron v. Aaron, 64 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ch. 1849).
57 See also Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IowA L. Rzv. 501,
506 (1948).
58 Cornwall v. Isham, 1 Day 35, 36 (Conn. 1802), citing Doe dem. Hind-
son v. Kersey, 4 Burn. Ecc. Law (5th ed. 1778) 88, 92 (1760).
59 See, e.g., NEB. R y. STAT. § 30-204 (Reissue 1964), which requires the
formalities of execution for all wills except nuncupative instruments.
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It is suggested by this writer that Lord Camden's image of a
group of conspirators converging on a dying testator like a flock
of vultures is an overly pessimistic view and should be examined in
light of modern social conditions and experience. One of the more
recent examinations of the disinterested witness rule was made by
the authors of the Uniform Probate Code. The authors responded to
criticism60 of the rule and dispensed with the requirement of non-
legatee witnesses."' The official comment to the section that omits
the rule notes that attorneys will still use disinterested witnesses,
but:
[T]he rare and innocent use of a member of the testator's family
on a home-drawn will would no longer be penalized. This change
does not increase appreciably the opportunity for fraud or undue
influence. A substantial gift by will to a person who is one of the
witnesses to the execution of the will would itself be a suspicious
circumstance, and the gift could be challenged on grounds of undue
influence. The requirement of disinterested witnesses has not suc-
ceeded in preventing fraud and undue influence; and in most cases
of undue influence, the influencer is careful not to sign as a witness
but to use disinterested witnesses. 62
The authors of the Code are not alone in their beliefs that interested
witnesses usually attest home-drawn wills and the rule does not
prevent fraud.63
One author has argued that it is a "medieval point of view" to
assume that an interested witness will lie.6 4 As noted previously,
the original English statutes required "credible witnesses" 65 to
testamentary instruments, and common law rules of evidence were
used to interpret "credible" to exclude parties who had an interest
in possible litigation concerning the will. The common law rule
forbidding parties to a suit to testify in their own behalf has long
since been abrogated.66
In summary, modern conditions and experience have weakened
the policy arguments that have supported the rule requiring dis-
60 Mvtechem, supra note 57; Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1941).
61 UN RnoM PROBATE CODE 2-505 (6), provides: "A will or any provision
thereof is not invalid because the will is signed by an interested
witness."
62 Supra note 60, at 49.
63 Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 61, at 12.
64 Mechem, supra note 57.
65 Supra note 11.
66 Evans, Common Law Rules of Testifying Applied to Wills, 25 MIcH.
L. REv. 238 (1927).
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interested witnesses to wills and codicils. The authors of the Uni-
form Probate Code and other commentators have recommended the
complete abolition of the rule. When a court is faced with the issues
of whether to abolish the rule, it must decide if the rule prevents
fraud often enough to risk frustrating honest testamentary efforts
by those unaware of the rule.
V. CONCLUSION
When a court is faced with the question of the validity of a
codicil attested to by interested witnesses, if there is a second,
validly executed codicil to the same will, the court can usually
find reasonable grounds for holding that the second codicil validated
the first. In deciding whether to hold the first codicil valid, the
court must also face the question of the value of the disinterested
witness rule. In deciding this question the court should consider
the view that the disinterested witness requirement has been in-
effective in preventing fraud, and instead has no doubt on many
occasions frustrated honest testamentary attempts. The issue to be
decided is thus whether fraud is prevented often enough to justify
the possibility of invalidating wills drawn by those unaware of the
rule.
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